Nowadays, vulnerability attacks occur frequently. Due to the information asymmetry between attackers and defenders, vulnerabilities can be divided into known and unknown. Existing researches mainly focus on the risk assessment of known vulnerabilities. However, unknown vulnerabilities are more threatening and harder to detect. Therefore, unknown vulnerability risk assessment deserves the widespread attention. To model the exploit process, directed graph models are applied to vulnerability risk assessment. And security metrics are used to quantify the exploitability of vulnerabilities. In this paper, according to the data source of nodes, related works of unknown vulnerability risk assessment based on directed graph models are divided into two types. One is based on network-level data, the other is based on system-level data. The former is to visualize the network status, while the latter is to reflect the running process of the system. The concept and purpose of these directed graph models are given at first. Then, these models are analyzed from three aspects, including advantages, flaws and solutions. After that, challenges and solutions of unknown vulnerability risk assessment based on directed graph models are given. Meantime, security metrics for unknown vulnerability risk assessment based on directed graph models are summarized and classified. Finally, future work directions of unknown vulnerability risk assessment are discussed from the perspective of techniques and application trends. Consequently, this paper can fill in the lack of current survey on unknown vulnerability risk assessment based on directed graph models.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the continuous expansion of network scale, current network has the characteristics of large number of nodes, complicated structure, diversified protocols and data enrichment. Under this circumstance, network security is facing unprecedented challenges. To improve the integrity and stability of the network, risk assessment is proposed to evaluate the possible risks and provide a basis for network security. Data from HACKMAGEDDON [1] shows that vulnerability attack becomes one of the top 10 attack techniques. Directed Graph Model (DGM) is a major method for vulnerability risk assessment because it can visualize the network status and provide decisions for network hardening [2] . Meantime, DGM can reflect the running process of the system. The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Ruilong Deng .
Vulnerability risk assessment based on directed graph models needs to accomplish both qualitative and quantitative tasks. For Known Vulnerability Risk Assessment (KVRA), vulnerability information can be obtained by vulnerability scanners, such as Nessus, Nmap, etc. Directed graphs can be generated automatically by existing tools. Meantime, standards such as Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) [3] can be directly used to quantify the exploitability of each known vulnerability. However, KVRA does not consider the situation that defenders may have less or no prior knowledge on vulnerabilities.
To solve this problem, the technology of Unknown Vulnerability Risk Assessment (UVRA) is proposed and should be given more attention because unknown (zero-day) vulnerabilities are harder to detect. Moreover, the threat and loss caused by this kind of attack are far more serious than known vulnerabilities. For UVRA, current researches often VOLUME 7, 2019 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ set a time point to divide known vulnerabilities into known and unknown vulnerabilities because the latter is difficult to obtain in reality [4] , [5] .
Due to the reason that KVRA only focuses on known vulnerabilities, the major task of UVRA is to propose new directed graph models or improve existing models to simulate zero-day exploits. Meantime, for unknown vulnerabilities, there is no existing standard to convert vulnerability scores. Therefore, another major task of UVRA is to propose new security metrics to quantify the exploitability of zero-day vulnerabilities. In this paper, security metrics are divided into standard and specific metrics based on their versatility. Vulnerability risk assessment based on directed graph models requires the quantification of nodes and paths. So, specific metrics are further divided into three aspects, including node metrics, path metrics and probabilistic metrics. And they will be discussed later.
In this paper, according to the data source of nodes, related works of UVRA based on directed graph models are divided into two types. One is based on network-level data, the other is based on system-level data. The concept and purpose of these directed graph models are given at first. Then, these models are analyzed from three aspects, including advantages, flaws and solutions. Meantime, corresponding examples are given to facilitate understanding, and security metrics for UVRA based on directed graph models are summarized and classified. Next, challenges and solutions of UVRA based on directed graph models are given. At last, future work directions of unknown vulnerability risk assessment are discussed from the perspective of techniques and application trends. Directed graph models for UVRA are often inspired or extended from the models for KVRA. Therefore, if a directed graph model has related works on KVRA, and this model or its extension can be applied to UVRA, the development process of this model on KVRA will also be introduced.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sect. II, a brief introduction of Unknown Vulnerability Risk Assessment (UVRA) based on Directed Graph Model (DGM) is given. In Sect. III, DGM for UVRA based on network-level data is given. In Sect. IV, DGM for UVRA based on systemlevel data is given. In Sect. V, challenges and solutions of UVRA based on DGM are discussed. In Sect. VI, future work directions of unknown vulnerability risk assessment are discussed from the perspective of techniques and application trends. Finally, the conclusion of this paper is given in Sect. VII.
II. PRELIMINARY
Network security refers to systems that protect Internet connections, such as hardware, software, and data from security attacks [6] . Risk assessment is used to identify potential hazards/threats, which often describes risks in a quantitative manner and appropriately represents uncertainty [7] . The ultimate goal of risk assessment is to improve the integrity and stability of the network.
Vulnerability risk assessment is one of the techniques for network security. As mentioned above, vulnerability risk assessment can be divided into KVRA and UVRA. KVRA only focuses on known vulnerabilities. On the basis of KVRA, URVA considers the information asymmetry between attackers and defenders, and it focuses on the risk caused by zero-day exploits. The definitions of zero-day (unknown) vulnerability and zero-day exploit are given as follows.
Zero-day Vulnerability [5] : The detail of a zero-day vulnerability is unknown except that its exploitation potentially yields any privilege on the destination host and depends on three assumptions:
• Network connection exists between source and destination host;
• Existing privilege on the source host;
• Destination host opens a remote access service. Zero-day Exploit [5] : Given a network composed of a set of hosts H, for each h ∈ H and x ∈ (serv(h) ∪ priv(h)), a zero-day vulnerability is denoted by v x . A zero-day exploit is the triple < v s , h, h > where < h, h > ∈ conn and s ∈ serv(h ), or < v p , h, h > where p ∈ priv(h). serv (h) and priv(h) respectively denote the services and privileges of hosts.
The commonalities of zero-day vulnerabilities must meet one of the following conditions [8] , [9] :
• Excluded by vulnerability scanners, such as Nessus, Nmap, etc.;
• Attackers know it, however, vulnerability databases such as National Vulnerability Database (NVD) have no record about it. In UVRA, directed graph models provide the qualitative method to reflect network status. More specifically, they can find out the possible associations between vulnerabilities in a managed network. Moreover, they also help provide decisions for security solutions and hardening [2] . The definition of directed graph is given as follows.
Directed Graph: Directed graph G = (V , E), where V denotes the set of vertexes, E indicates the set of edges, and each edge represents the correlation between vertexes.
|V | denotes the number of vertexes in G, where V = {v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n }. |E| indicates the number of edges in G,
Technologies for KVRA cannot meet the requirement of zero-day vulnerabilities, which is mainly caused by three reasons. First, for zero-day vulnerabilities, the information owned by attackers and defenders is asymmetric. That is, attackers often know the existence of a zero-day vulnerability in advance. However, defenders will only know it after the attack occurs. Second, directed graph models for KVRA may need appropriate changes to adapt UVRA. Third, existing databases such as NVD ignore the impact of unknown network attacks. Therefore, they cannot accurately evaluate the security improvement in network hardening.
Nevertheless, directed graph models used in UVRA are often the extension of models applied to KVRA. Meanwhile, it has been mentioned in Sect. I that unknown vulnerabilities may be divided from the set of known vulnerabilities by setting a time point. The benefit of this method is that the information of these zero-day vulnerabilities can be used to verify the correctness of risk assessment because they are actually from known vulnerabilities. That is, UVRA based on directed graph models is inspired from KVRA. Therefore, if a directed graph model, which is used in KVRA at first, can be applied to UVRA after appropriate extension, the development process of both known and unknown vulnerability risk assessment will be given to explain the changes in this model.
According to the data source of nodes, related works of UVRA based on directed graph models are divided into two types. One is based on network-level data, the other is based on system-level data. Comparisons between these two data sources are given in Table 1 .
Network-level data such as vulnerability information can be easily obtained from existing vulnerability databases. However, system-level data such as system call comes from the kernel of hosts and does not depend on network connectivity. In other words, it is hard to build a unified database for system-level data. Therefore, the acquisition process of network-level data is easier than system-level data. For vulnerability databases such as NVD, there exists dedicated communities or teams to provide support. However, systemlevel data often comes from a managed network, which may be only supported by the system administrator. In terms of tamper protection, network-level data can be crawled and parsed, so it is likely to be tampered maliciously. However, system-level data comes from hosts, which is the underlying data. Therefore, it is difficult to be tampered.
III. DGM FOR UVRA BASED ON NETWORK-LEVEL DATA
This section introduces directed graph models for Unknown Vulnerability Risk Assessment (UVRA) whose nodes are constructed by network-level data. Directed graph models that rely on network-level data include attack graph, resource graph and Bayesian network. Extended models of these directed graphs will also be discussed.
The rest of this section is arranged as follows. First, the concepts of these models are given, including the definitions and purposes. Next, the general process of applying these directed graphs to UVRA is given, and related works of these directed graph models will be analyzed. Finally, these directed graph models will be discussed from three aspects, including advantages, flaws and solutions.
A. ATTACK GRAPH (AG)
AG is used to find all attack paths that can reach the attack target by simulating the process of network attacks. In addition to the network connectivity provided by default, to construct an attack graph, the open services of each host in a managed network are required. Network connectivity between hosts belongs to the network layer of Open System Interconnection (OSI) model. And most open services of hosts such as ftp and http belong to the application layer of OSI model. Attackers often use vulnerability scanners to obtain vulnerabilities from these open services at first, and then use these vulnerabilities to achieve attack intention.
According to the specific meaning of nodes and edges, attack graphs are divided into state-based representation attack graphs and logical attack graphs. In state-based representation attack graphs (or called state-enumeration attack graphs), each node denotes a state, and each edge indicates the condition of state transition. In logical attack graphs, each node represents an exploit, and each edge denotes the correlation between exploits. Logical attack graphs are also called exploit dependency attack graphs. Risk flow attack graph and zero-day attack graph are the extended models of attack graphs. They both belong to logical attack graphs. These models will be analyzed in detail later. Here the definition of attack graph is given below at first.
Attack Graph [10] : An attack graph G is a directed bipartite graph G = (E ∪ C, R r ∪ R i ), where E and C are the sets of exploits and security conditions, and the edges R r ⊆ C × E and R i ⊆ E × C respectively denote require and imply relations. More specifically, require relation denotes that the exploit cannot be successful unless corresponding condition is satisfied. And imply relation represents executing the exploit will satisfy corresponding condition.
AG is first officially applied to vulnerability risk assessment in [11] , and an example of original AG is given in Fig. 1 . Each node denotes the state of a host, where S g indicates the goal state to reach. And S i shows the state before reaching the goal, where i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Each edge represents the condition required for state transition. Although this work is the basis of vulnerability risk assessment based on attack graph, there still exists several problems, which are summarized as follows:
• Poor scalability and analysis complexity; • Ignorance of the dependency between vulnerabilities, which may cause misleading results;
• The probability of measuring the success of a state transition depends on expert knowledge, in other words, this quantitative method is subjective. To solve the poor scalability and analysis complexity of [11] , in literature [12] , the assumption of monotonicity is used to obtain a concise, scalable graph-based representation, which indicates that the successful application of another exploit will never invalid the precondition of a given exploit.
In literature [13] , [14] , the problem of ignoring the dependency between vulnerabilities in [11] is solved by applying Bayesian network to attack graph. This model is called Bayesian Attack Graph (BAG). However, the general quantization method is not given in [13] , [14] , but it can be founded in [10] . The example of KVRA based on BAG will be introduced in Sect. III-C. The graph generation complexity of method proposed in [14] is O(N 3 ), where N means the number of branches. Marginal Probabilities (MP) computing complexity is O(2 n ), where n indicates the number of variables. Genetic Algorithm (GA) complexity is O(GN log N ), where G represents the number of generations, and N means the population size. In literature [10] , Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) is introduced to quantify the exploitability of vulnerabilities, which tries to solve the subjectivity problem of quantification in [11] .
Besides Bayesian network, in literature [15] , another probabilistic directed graph model, called Hidden Markov Model (HMM), is used to construct probabilistic mapping between network observation and attack status. The definition of HMM is given after (2) . The exploitability of each vulnerability (D v i ) is calculated by (1):
where AV denotes Attack Vector, AC indicates Attack Complexity, and Au represents Authentication. AV , AC and Au are the base metrics of CVSS. The probability distribution matrix of state transition is given in (2):
where I j denotes the weight that state S i is converted to S j via exploiting vulnerability v i . The complexity of method in [15] is O(N 2 T ), where N indicates the length of hidden states set, and T represents a constant. Hidden Markov Model [15] : A HMM (λ) is a probabilistic model of time series, which is determined by probability matrix of state transition (A), probability matrix of observations (B), and probability vector of initial states (π). And it can be defined as λ = (A, B, π), where
Q is a set of all possible states, V is a set of all possible observations, N indicates the number of possible states, and M represents the number of possible observations. 
where i = 1, 2, . . . , N , and j = 1, 2, . . . , N . a ij is a probability of converting from state q i at time t to state q j at time t + 1.
• B is a probability matrix of observations.
where k = 1, 2, . . . , M , and j = 1, 2, . . . , N . b j (k) is a probability of generating observation v k under the condition of state q j at time t.
• π is a probability vector of initial state.
where i = 1, 2, . . . , N . π i is a probability of being in state q i at time t = 1. In literature [16] , the problem of ignorance on the dependency between vulnerabilities in [11] is also taken into consideration. Different from the idea of applying probabilistic directed graph models to attack graph, a model called Risk Flow Attack Graph (RFAG) is proposed to model network security by risk flow. The definition of RFAG is given below.
Risk Flow Attack Graph [16] : A RFAG can be defined as a tuple RFAG = {N , E, τ, v, C, F}, where • N = N s ∪ N g ∪ N m stands for the set of nodes, where N s indicates the initial capabilities of attackers, N g represents the ultimate goal an attacker aims to achieve, and N m denotes the multi-set of nodes η i for which ∃ε 1 , ε 2 ∈ E|[(η i ∈ pre(ε 1 ) ∧ (η i ∈ post(ε 2 ))], pre() and post() respectively stand for the set of pre-and post-conditions. Each element in the node set has a value of true or false.
is the set of edges, which represents exploits in network.
• τ ⊆ N × N . An ordered pair (N pre , N post ) ∈ τ if there exists an exploit edge ε ∈ E that N pre ∈ pre(ε) ∧ N post ∈ post(ε).
• v : E → Vuls is a mapping from an edge to its corresponding vulnerability. In a RFAG, an edge ε ∈ E represents an exploit which is related to a certain vulnerability Vul(ε). The metrics of the vulnerability will help determine the risk capacity and risk flow on edge.
• C is the risk capacity set of constants defined on E. The value of risk capacity c(ε) is given by the CVSS base score of the vulnerability related to ε, that is, c(ε) = Calc(Vul(ε)|T metric (AV , AC, Au, C, I , A)) and c(ε) ∈ [0, 10]. According to CVSS specifications, c(ε) defines the maximum risk brought to the system once the correlated vulnerability is exploited.
• F is the risk flow set defined on E. Given an edge ε ∈ E, f e ∈ F denotes the amount of risk flow on edge ε, which indicates the actual risk when an exploit take place.
In this work, the attack payoff and effort values of each path are calculated by (9) and (10):
where CI denotes Confidentiality Impact, II indicates Integrity Impact, and AI represents Availability Impact. They are also the base metrics of CVSS. p means an attack path.
where AV denotes Attack Vector, AC indicates Attack Complexity, and Au represents Authentication. If risk assessment depends on two or more factors, comprehensive evaluation method can be used to obtain more accurate result. First, a single-factor evaluation matrix should be calculated, which denotes the fuzzy relationship between risk factors and the final risk severity. Then, each factor will be assigned a weight to form a vector A = {a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n }, where 0 < a i < 1, and n i=1 a i = 1. At last, the final evaluation result B is computed by (11) :
where A is a weight vector, and R represents a single-factor evaluation matrix. The complexity of [16] is O(N ch · N s · P), where N s indicates source nodes, N ch means the children nodes of N s , and P represents paths. The idea of attack graph with risk flow to model network security is also applied to industrial Internet of Things (IoT). In literature [17] , attack graph is applied to industrial IoT to solve two problems, including the quantification and finding on attack paths. Graph generation complexity of this work is O(n ep · n p ), where n ep represents the number of elements in the set of attack instances, and n p denotes the number of elements of the reachable precursor property. Attack reward IMP (or called attack payoff in [16] ) is calculated by (12) : (12) where e represents the edge of an attack path. The equation to compute attack cost EXP (or called attack effort in [16] ) is the same as (10) . Equation (13) , (14) and (15) are used to calculate the maximum loss flow:
where lc(e) represents the difference between IMP(e) and EXP(e).
where d m indicates the max flow loss in the preceding attack, p denotes an attack path, and lf − represents the potential loss to next node. where γ represents the ratio of d m to the sum of loss capacity in the preceding attack. The impact of time measurement group and environment measurement group on quantization is not taken into consideration in this work. The process of Known Vulnerability Risk Assessment (KVRA) based on Attack Graph (AG) can be summarized as Fig. 2 . Common vulnerability scanners used for vulnerability risk assessment include Nessus, Nmap, etc. Detailed vulnerability information can be obtained from NVD.
In the early stage, attack graphs are generated by manual construction. This method leads to high error rate and poor scalability. In the previous studies [18] , [19] , Finite State Machine (FSM) is widely used in risk assessment, which is a kind of state-based representation attack graph. FSM can represent the transition between a limited number of states. However, it is not currently applied to unknown vulnerabilities, so it is not analyzed in detail here.
Nowadays, some tools support generating attack graphs automatically, such as MulVAL, TVA, Cauldron, NetSPA, etc. They are compared in Table 2 . Multiple Prerequisite (MP) graph is a kind of attack graphs. MP graph contains three node types, and an example of MP graph is shown in Fig. 3 .
First, each state node indicates the access level of attacker on a specific host. Second, each prerequisite node denotes an accessibility group or a credential. Third, each vulnerability instance node represents a specific vulnerability on a particular port. Each edge in MP graph indicates the relationship between nodes. These three node types are respectively represented as circles, rectangles and triangles in Fig. 3 .
Comparisons of above works are shown in Table 3 . From Table 3 , it can be discovered that in KVRA based on attack graph, the elimination of cycles is often implemented by the assumption of monotonicity. In addition, the application of vulnerability risk assessment is gradually shifting from traditional network to enterprise network and industrial IoT. For example, the size of an enterprise network determines the complexity of assigning corresponding permissions and services to each host. In this condition, the vulnerabilities generated by the improper configuration of hosts may be exploited by attackers. Vulnerability risk assessment based on attack graph can visualize the network condition. Further, it provides the decision for optimal network hardening.
Researches mentioned above make a great contribution to network security, but they do not consider the attacks caused by unknown vulnerabilities. To solve this problem, an extended model of attack graph, called zero-day attack graph [4] , [5] , is proposed to compose with both known and zero-day exploits. Each path in this model is called zeroday attack path. A zero-day attack path is a multi-step attack path that includes one or more zero-day exploits [20] . The definition of zero-day attack graph is given below.
Zero-day Attack Graph [5] : Given the set of exploits of zero-day vulnerabilities E 0 and their pre-and post-conditions C 0 , the set of exploits of known vulnerabilities E 1 and their pre-and post-conditions C 1 , let E = E 0 ∪ E 1 , C = C 0 ∪ C 1 , and extend pre(.) and post(.) to E → C (as the union of relations). The directed graph G =< E ∪ C, {< x, y >: (y ∈ E ∧ x ∈ pre(y)) ∨ (x ∈ E ∧ y ∈ post(x))} > is called a zero-day attack graph.
Next, the way to apply attack graph to UVRA will be presented. Then, related works on vulnerabilities risk assessment based on AG will be given. 
1) APPLYING AG TO UVRA
Unknown Vulnerability Risk Assessment (UVRA) based on attack graph is shown in Fig. 4 . Compared with Fig. 2 , it can be discovered that both KVRA and UVRA based on AG contain three steps, including information acquisition, graph generation, and vulnerability quantification.
The first step can be implemented with security tools, including vulnerability scanners like Nessus, and security sensors like Intrusion Detection System (IDS)/Intrusion Prevention System (IPS). The purpose of this step is to obtain necessary information as input to construct attack graph, including services and privileges of hosts, connectivity and vulnerability information.
Different from KVRA, the second step of UVRA based on AG is setting a time point to divide known vulnerabilities into known vulnerabilities and zero-day vulnerabilities because zero-day vulnerabilities are difficult to obtain in reality [4] , [5] . For example, if the time point is set as 2018/12/31, vulnerabilities before 2018/12/31 are used as known vulnerabilities, and vulnerabilities after this time point are regarded as zero-day vulnerabilities. Except for this method, in literature [21] , suspicious activities whose signatures are not defined previously in Snort IDS/IPS are regarded as zero-day exploits. The former focuses on software or web applications, and the latter focuses on network packets.
The second difference between KVRA and UVRA based on AG is that for unknown vulnerabilities, there is no existing standard to convert vulnerability scores. Zero-day vulnerabilities are hard to measure because the process of discovering and exploiting vulnerabilities is less predictable [4] . To solve this problem, novel network security metrics are proposed, such as k-zero day safety [4] , [5] . Further analysis of these related works will be introduced later.
In the domain of vulnerability risk assessment, security metrics are important because they are used to quantify the exploitability of vulnerabilities.
For known vulnerabilities, two kinds of scores need to be calculated, including individual score and cumulative score [22] , [23] . Individual score represents intrinsic probability of an exploit being executed. It can be obtained by existing standards, such as CVSS, Common Configuration Scoring System (CCSS) [24] and Common Weakness Scoring System (CWSS) [25] . CVSS score is used in most current studies to measure the probability that a vulnerability is successfully exploited [10] , [17] , [26] , [27] .
Besides CVSS, in literature [28] , a metric suite for attack graph is proposed, which is given in Table 4 . In literature [29] , to overcome shortcomings of path metrics, a complimentary suite of attack graph-based security metrics is proposed, including the Shortest Path (SP), the Number of Paths (NP) and the Mean of Path Lengths (MPL). In literature [30] , model-based quantitative network security metrics based on attack graph are divided into five aspects. In literature [31] , a systematic classification of existing security metrics based on network reachability information is proposed. Although these works make the contribution on the classification of security metrics, which are summarized in Table 4 , the classification of security metrics for UVRA is still a blank. Therefore, the supplementary work is made in our paper, which can be seen in Table 7 .
In literature [32] , the calculation formulas of topology metrics (connectivity, cycle, and depth) are given below:
where w is the number of subgraphs in the graph, and d indicates the total number of nodes in the graph.
where c represents the number of cycles in the graph.
where c i means the number of nodes in different subgraphs, and s i denotes the depth of each subgraph. In order to consider these three metrics comprehensively, the combined score is given as follows:
where n is the number of considered metrics, and s i indicates the individual score of each metric. In literature [10] , a probabilistic metric called cumulative score is first proposed. The relationship between exploits is first divided into two categories, including conjunctive and disjunctive [22] . After that, hybrid relationship is also taken into consideration. The definition of cumulative score is given below, which denotes the overall probability that an attacker can successfully reach and execute an exploit.
Cumulative Score [10] : Given an acyclic attack graph G(E ∪ C, R r ∪ R i ), and any individual score assignment function p : • P(e) = p(e) · c∈R r (e) P(c)
where the operator ⊕ is recursively defined as ⊕P(e) = P(e) for any e ∈ E and ⊕(S 1 ∪ S 2 ) = ⊕S 1 + ⊕S 2 − ⊕S 1 · ⊕S 2 for any disjoint and non-empty sets S 1 ⊆ E and S 2 ⊆ E. An example of network configuration and Attack Graph (AG) is shown in Fig. 5 . Both host1 and host2 provide secure shell (ssh) service, and they are in the intranet. host0 represents an attacker who wants to penetrate into the intranet from the external network, so as to obtain the root privilege of host2. In this attack graph, ovals represent conditions, and rectangles denote exploits. Each condition represents a system state, and each exploit between hosts is reflected as a transition between system states. The decimals in rectangles, which are calculated by the base metrics of CVSS, represent the individual scores (or called exploitability) of vulnerabilities. Decimals next to rectangles denote the cumulative score of vulnerabilities. In Fig. 5 , the exploitability of ssh and local_bof are respectively 0.4 and 0.1, where bof represents buffer overflow. The cumulative scores of node ssh(1, 2) and user(2) can be calculated as follows:
• P(user(2)) = P(ssh(1, 2))+P(ssh(0, 2))−P(ssh(1, 2))× P(ssh(0, 2)) = 0.16 + 0.4 − 0.16 × 0.4 = 0.05 However, for zero-day vulnerabilities, there is no existing standard to convert them into scores. They are hard to measure because the process of discovering and exploiting vulnerabilities is less predictable [4] . To solve this problem, a novel network security metric called k-zero day safety is proposed [4] , [5] . The definition of k-zero day safety is given below.
k-Zero Day Safety [4] : Given the set of zero-day exploits E 0 , the definition can be that: • a function k0d(.) :
, where min(.) denotes the minimum value. For any k ∈ [0, k), a is regarded as k -zero day safe. This metric can be regarded as a node metric. The reason is that the core of this metric is to calculate the number of vulnerabilities (that is, nodes in the zero-day attack graph), which are required for compromising a network asset. For example, Fig. 6 shows network configuration and corresponding zero-day attack graph.
In Fig. 6 , host2 and host3 are located in the intranet, and they only provide ssh service. host1 is located in the demilitarized zone (that is, the space between two firewalls). The firewall1 allows traffic to and from host1. The firewall2 allows traffic to and from host2, but only allows connections from host3. host0 is an attacker in the external network who tries to obtain the root privilege of host3. For known vulnerabilities, both vulnerability scanner and attack graph will lead to the same conclusion that the network configuration in Fig. 6 is secure [20] . However, for zero-day vulnerabilities, there are two attack paths for attackers to reach the target (that is, the root privilege of host3) in Fig. 6 , which are described by red dotted lines. One is obtaining the user privilege of host1 at first, and then the attacker uses the host2 as a Jump Server to indirectly attack host3 by ssh service. The other is that the attacker uses the ssh service of host2 and host3 to directly attack host3 after achieving the user privilege of host1.
Here the network asset A = {< root, 3 >}. The left attack path contains three distinct zero-day vulnerabilities.
According to the definition, exploits of < v ssh , 0, 1 >, < v ssh , 1, 2 > and < v ssh , 2, 3 > in the right attack path will be counted as one exploit because they involve the same zero-day vulnerability (ssh). So, it can be discovered that k0d(A) = 2, where k0d() is the function to calculate k-zero day safety.
Although this metric makes a great contribution to evaluating zero-day attacks, it has following problems at the same time:
• This metric simply calculates the number of vulnerabilities required for destroying network assets. Meantime, the correlation between vulnerabilities and the impact of known vulnerabilities on UVRA are not taken into consideration;
• It is difficult to determine exact value of k;
• It assumes the existence of a complete attack graph, however, this assumption is difficult to establish in large networks [20] . In order to solve these problems, existing researches mainly focus on two aspects:
• Improving the calculation ability of k-zero day safety; • Improving the metric system of k-zero day safety. In literature [20] , the exact value of k is obtained by calculating the lower bound and upper bound of k. Corresponding processes to calculate these two bounds are respectively summarized as Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 .
In Fig. 7 , C i denotes the set of initial conditions, E * indicates the set of known and zero-day exploits, l is an integer representing the desired lower bound of k, c g means the goal condition, C denotes the set of conditions, E indicates the set of exploits, C new represents the set of newly satisfied conditions, π(c) means the mapping which associates each condition with a set of attack paths leading to it, e ∈ E, c represents the pre-or post-condition of an exploit, and G denotes the partial zero-day attack graph.
In Fig. 8 , R r and R i respectively denote require and imply relations. More specifically, require relation denotes that the exploit cannot be successful unless corresponding condition is satisfied. And imply relation represents executing the exploit will satisfy corresponding condition. zdu(c) indicates the number of required exploits for reaching initial conditions, zdu(e) means the number of distinct zero-day vulnerabilities in an edge, and u represents the upper bound of k.
The efficiency of graph generation is improved by using on-demand method and reusing the partial attack graphs that have been generated in the decision process. This method can apply to large networks because it spends less than 20s to build an attack graph of nearly 90,000 nodes. Processing time and percentage of nodes are used as performance metrics of algorithms. The shortcoming is that they all focus on improving the computational efficiency of k-zero day safety, but no one considers the correlation between vulnerabilities. The future development of this model is to improve the approximate algorithm for ranking the partial solutions.
Compared with [20] , in literature [4] , a new heuristic algorithm, which computes k-zero day safety as the shortest path in a directed acyclic graph, is proposed for efficiently computing the metrics in special cases. This work relies on the assumption that both conjunctive relationship between conditions and the similarity between zero-day exploits are mostly limited to each host or each small group of hosts. The problem of determining the value of k is converted to finding the shortest path in the set of zero-day exploits.
To improve the security metric system of zero-day vulnerability, in literature [33] , network diversity is modeled as a security metric so as to evaluate the robustness of networks against potential zero-day attacks.
In literature [34] , tolerance is defined as a metric to capture the required zero-day attack effort. However, they only consider individual zero-day weakness under different targets and ignore the multiple zero-day exploits.
Inspired from k-zero day safety, in literature [9] , three security metrics are proposed to improve the metric system of k-zero day safety, including k-zero day safety of a zero-day vulnerability, length of the k-zero day safety, and exploitability of k-zero day safety. Length of the k-zero day safety can be divided into node metrics because it indicates the zeroday attack path which includes the minimum number of zeroday vulnerabilities. k-zero day safety can be divided into probabilistic metrics because it represents the exploitability level of each attack path. In this work, the impact of known vulnerabilities on evaluating the risk of zero-day attacks is taken into consideration, and the risk of zero-day attacks can be differentiated. The formulas used in risk assessment are as follows:
where Exp(V i ) denotes the exploitability of vulnerability V i , and PL represents the length of the k-zero day safety path. Equation (20) means the exploitability of each attack path which leads to the attack goal.
where KZS indicates the k-zero day safety, and KPath denotes k-zero day safety path. Equation (21) represents the probability of exploiting each vulnerability.
In (22), Impact(V i ) = 6.4. Exploitability of each zero-day vulnerability is set as 10. Therefore, the shortcoming of their work is that the exploitability and impact of each zero-day vulnerability are set to a constant value, which cannot reflect the actual situation well.
2) DISCUSSION ON AG FROM ADVANTAGES, FLAWS AND SOLUTIONS
Attack graph is a powerful tool to access network security and provide decision for network hardening. It can be used to identify undesirable activities caused by attackers. Meantime, it can also help security administrators understand whether given critical resources can be compromised through multistep attacks. The advantage of attack graph is that it can be automatically generated by tools. However, as a qualitative model, attack graph also has some flaws. First, attack graph only reflects whether a managed network is secure or not, it cannot quantify the threat level of network. Second, attack graph may include cycles, which is inconvenient to use security metrics to quantify later. Third, attack graph cannot deal with the uncertainty of network attacks.
Zero-day attack graph fixes the flaw that only considering known exploits. In this model, both known and zero-day exploits are considered. However, in terms of complexity, zero-day attack graph is comparable to traditional attack graph. The reason is that the number of added zero-day exploits (which depends on the number of remote services and privileges) on each host should be comparable to the number of known vulnerabilities [4] . That is, vulnerabilities depend on the size of the network. As the network density becomes larger, there is a greater likelihood of vulnerabilities in the network [35] .
The assumption of monotonicity is often used to eliminate the cycles in attack graphs. Besides this method, in literature [23] , cycles are divided into three types. The first type is that cycles can be removed directly. The second type is that cycles can be broken. The third type is that cycles can neither be removed or broken. This method is complex in practice.
To address the uncertainty of network attacks, Bayesian network is often applied to constructing attack graph, and the corresponding content will be given in Sect. III-C.
B. RESOURCE GRAPH (RG)
Resource Graph (RG) is used to reflect the strategy that may be chosen by attackers to reach the final condition (that is, a critical network asset) with the least effort. Each node in resource graph indicates a zero-day exploit [33] . Each edge represents the dependency between zero-day exploits. Resource graph focuses on remote access services, such as http, rsh and ssh. These services all come from the application layer of OSI model. The definition of resource graph is given below.
Resource Graph [33] : Given a network composed of a set of hosts H, a set of resources R with the resource mapping res(.) : H → 2 R , a set of zero-day exploits E = {< r, h s , h d > |h s ∈ H , h d ∈ H , r ∈ res(h d )} and the collection of their pre-and post-conditions C, a resource graph is a directed graph G(E ∪ C, R r ∪ R i ), where R r ⊆ C × E and R i ⊆ E × C are the pre-and post-condition relations respectively.
1) APPLYING RG TO UVRA
Resource graph is similar to attack graph in information acquisition and graph generation. The reason is that resource graph is syntactically equivalent to attack graph, but resource graph aims at identifying zero-day attacks rather than known vulnerabilities. Network diversity is used to evaluate risk assessment, which is inspired by bio-diversity. Network diversity can be regarded as a kind of node metrics, which is the same as k-zero day safety. However, different from kzero day safety, network diversity focuses on remote access resources.
It is a common belief that greater diversity in software and services may help to improve the network security [4] . Network diversity is modeled as a security metric for evaluating the robustness of networks against potential zero-day attacks [33] . An example of network configuration and resource graph is given in Fig. 9 [33] . In Fig. 9, host0 is an attacker in the external network and aims to own the user privilege of host3, host1 and host2 provide rsh service, host3 provides ssh service, firewall1 allows the access to host1 but blocks to host2, firewall2 allows the access from host1 or host2 to host3. Fig. 9 shows three attack paths for attacker to obtain the user privilege of host3, which are described by dotted lines.
A network G consists of a set of hosts H = {h 1 , h 2 , . . . , h n } and resource types R = {r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r m }. The equations used for computing metrics (d 1 , d 2 , d 3 ) [33] are given as follows:
where t = n i=1 |res(h i )|, and p j = |{h i :r j ∈res(h i )}| t (1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ m). r(G) denotes the effective richness of resources in network, and d 1 computes the number of distinct resources inside a network and applies similarity-sensitive bio-diversity metric to take similarity between different resource types into consideration. For example, in Fig. 9 , H = {host 0 , host 1 , host 2 , host 3 } and R = {firewall, rsh, ssh}, t = 2+2+2+1 = 7, and p 2 = 2+2+2+0 7 . The way to calculate {p 1 , p 3 } is the same as p 2 . In this way, d 1 can be calculated.
where C represents the set of security conditions, c g indicates the goal condition and c g ∈ C, for each c ∈ C and q ∈ seq(c), R(q) denotes {r : r ∈ R, r appears in q}, and min(.) returns the minimum value in a set. This metric is based on the least attack effort required for compromising important resources, and considers the causal relationship between resources. For example, in Fig. 9 , the red dotted line contains three exploits, but two exploits contain the same resource (rsh). So d 2 of this attack path is 2 3 .
where p represents the conditional probability of c g being satisfied if all initial conditions are true, and p denotes the minimum value of p when some edges are deleted from R s (that is, edges from resources types to resource instances). This metric reflects the average attack effort required for compromising critical assets. For example, Fig. 10 shows the impact of reusing an exploit (http), which is described by the dotted lines on the right-hand side of Fig. 10 . In Fig. 10 , d 3 = 0.0049 0.056 . Except for external factors, such as lack of data sets that can represent real network, the main limitations of their work are given as follows:
• Their proposed model relies on the availability and accuracy of inputs;
• Their work focuses on modeling diversity without considering the impact of other factors, such as the cost on maintenance;
• They assume that the probabilities of all assets on containing zero-day vulnerabilities are the same. Based on this work, a new probabilistic model [36] is proposed for addressing the limitations of original d 3 metric. For example, invalid result will return during simulation, and once exploits are considered to be partially ordered, the attack likelihood will not necessarily be the lowest when all resources are assumed to be distinct [33] . The core idea of this new probabilistic model is to add a new parent node to exploits with the same resource type. An example of redesigned model is shown in Fig. 11 . The left-hand side of Fig. 11 is from Fig. 10 . The right-hand side of Fig. 11 represents the idea of resigning model for d 3 . The limitation of their work is the high complexity of analyzing a resource graph.
In order to model different resources and the causal relationship among resources, the concept of resource graph is extended, and a labeled directed graph called extended resource graph is proposed [37] . The definition of extended resource graph is given as follows.
Extended Resource Graph [37] : Given a network composed of • a set of hosts H , • a set of services S, with the service mapping serv(.) : 
In an extended resource graph, each pair represents a security-related condition, and each row below the rectangle indicates different hardening option, which is available for the condition. Each exploit node includes the information of a service running on the destination host and source host. The limitation of their work is that all service instances are assumed to have the same probability to be exploited. Therefore, they improve this work by considering the uneven distribution of services along an attack path [38] .
2) DISCUSSION ON RG FROM ADVANTAGES, FLAWS AND SOLUTIONS
Resource Graph (RG) and traditional AG are closely related. The reason is that RG is syntactically equivalent to AG. For this reason, RG can be constructed by existing tools in Table 2 , which are originally used to construct traditional AG.
However, the limitations of resource graph are the existence of cycles and high complexity of analyzing a resource graph, which are the same as traditional attack graph and zero-day attack graph. The solutions of these two problems can refer to the methods mentioned in attack graph. Meantime, this model only focuses on remote access resources (such as services or applications that are reachable from other hosts in the network), and the availability and accuracy of inputs are required during the process of forming a resource graph.
In the future, initial exploits of client-side applications, insider attacks and user mistakes should be considered when modeling resource graph.
C. BAYESIAN NETWORK (BN)
Bayesian Network (BN) is a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG), which is also called belief network. Nodes represent random variables {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n }, and edges denote conditional independences between variables. Each node has a corresponding Conditional Probability Table ( CPT), which is used to quantify the effect of the parent node on child node. Data source of nodes in BN comes from software vulnerabilities and open services. They belong to the application layer of OSI model.
The model constructed by applying the BN to attack graph is called Bayesian Attack Graph (BAG). Detailed analysis of this model will be carried out with an example. Meantime, the extended models of BN, including Dynamic Bayesian Networks (DBN), Bayesian Decision Network (BDN), and Fuzzy Probability Bayesian Network (FPBN) will also be analyzed in detail when introducing the development process of BN. Here the definition of BN is given below at first.
Bayesian Network [39] : Given a set of random variables X = {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n } in a Bayesian network, the joint probability of all variables is given by a chain rule with the following equation:
where Pa(x i ) indicates that the specific value of the variable is in the parent node x i . Bayesian network, also known as Bayesian belief network, is based on Bayes theory. The theorem equation is given as follows:
where P(X | Y ) represents the posterior probability, P(X ) denotes the prior probability, P(Y | X ) means the probability that event Y occurs under the condition of event X , and P(Y ) represents the probability that event Y occurs without condition limitation.
In literature [40] , to provide a more compact representation of attack paths, the concept of Bayesian Attack Graph (BAG) is first proposed and applied to probabilistic analysis of risk assessment. However, the formal definition of BAG is not given, which can be found in [14] . Vulnerability risk assessment based on BAG is shown in Fig. 12 . And the definition of BAG is given after Fig. 12 . This model depends on two assumptions. First, given a node X i , each parent node of X i can independently influence the state of X i . Second, once reaching a compromised state, an attacker will never need backtrack (that is, the assumption of monotonicity mentioned in attack graph). The local conditional probability distribution at node i is computed by (28) :
where x i = 1 is a true state, which denotes a host with a compromised state, and pa i indicates the parent node of x i in BAG. Bayesian Attack Graph [14] : Let S be a set of attributes and A be the set of atomic attacks defined on S. A Bayesian Attack Graph is a tuple BAG = (S, τ, ε, P), where • S = N internal ∪ N external ∪ N terminal . N external denotes the set of attributes S i for which a ∈ A|S i = post(a). N internal denotes the set of attributes S j for which ∃a 1 , a 2 ∈ A|[S j = pre(a 1 ) and S j = post(a 2 )]. N terminal denotes the set of attributes S k for which a ∈ A|S k = pre(a).
• P is a set of discrete conditional probability distribution functions. Each attribute S j ∈ N internal ∪ N terminal has a discrete local conditional probability distribution (LCPD) representing the values of Pr(S j |Pa[S j ]). An example of applying Bayesian network to calculate the probability that an attacker can reach each state (condition) is shown in Fig. 13 . To calculate the conditional probability distributions p(X i | pa i ) [41] , which represent the probabilities that an attacker reaches security state X i when given the observations of the set of preconditions pa i . Two possible cases should be considered, including logical AND and logical OR, which are similar to the idea of cumulative score in attack graph. They belong to probabilistic metrics, and their calculation formulas are given respectively in (29) and (30):
where p v j denotes the probability that an attacker successfully exploits a vulnerability v j . For example, the probability of node user (2) in Fig. 13 belongs to the logical OR case. So the probability of this node is:
• P(user(2)) = 1 − (1 − P(rsh(0, 2))(1 − P(rsh(1, 2)) = P(rsh(0, 2)) + P(rsh(1, 2)) − P(rsh(0, 2)) × P(rsh(1, 2)) = 1 − (1 − 0.675)(1 − 0.9) = 0.675 + 0.9 − 0.675 × 0.9 = 0.9675 Different from [40] , in literature [42] , the probabilities of successful exploits are assigned to nodes rather than edges. The advantage of this method is that it can effectively combine the standard measurement such as CVSS to quantify the exploitability of each node. Moreover, in literature [42] , Dynamic Bayesian Network (DBN), which can incorporate temporal factors into attack graph-based security metrics, is used to capture the evolving nature of vulnerabilities. In literature [43] , DBN is also used to perform dynamic risk assessment. Their work has strong subjectivity because CPTs in their model are based on expert knowledge. Fuzzy comprehensive evaluation methods can be used to improve the objectivity of risk assessment. The definition of DBN is given below.
Dynamic Bayesian Network [44] : A Dynamic Bayesian Network (DBN) is an extended model of Bayesian Network and models probability distributions over semi-infinite collection of random variable variables, Z 1 , Z 2 , . . .. Variables are typically partition into Z t = (U t , X t , Y t ) to separately represent the input, hidden and output variables of a statespace model. The index t is increased by one every time a new observation arrived. The observation represents something has changed, which makes a model of a discrete-event system. DBN is defined to be a pair, (B 1 , B → ), where B 1 is a BN which defines the prior P(Z 1 ), and B → is a two-slice temporal Bayesian network (2TBN) which defines P(Z t |Z t−1 .) by means of a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) as follows:
where Z i t is the ith node at time t, which could be a component of X t ,Y t or U t , and Pa(Z i t ) are the parents of Z i t in the graph. The nodes in the first slice of a 2TBN do not have any parameters associated with them, but each node in the second slice of the 2TBN has an associated conditional probability distribution (CPD), which defines P(Z i t |Pa(Z i t )) for all t > 1. In literature [45] , Bayesian network is used to capture the uncertainty in attack structures, attacker actions and alerts. To capture the uncertainty in attack structure, CVSS metrics such as Access Complexity (AC) and Exploitability (E) are used to derive the CPT parameters. To capture the uncertainty in attacker actions, an Attack Action Node (AAN) is proposed. Attack action exists if the state of an AAN is true, otherwise, the probability of vulnerability exploit is 0. However, the correctness of evaluation depends on the reliability of security sensors.
A Local Observation Model (LOM) is used to model the uncertainty in alerts, which is shown in Fig. 14. More specifically, a pair of nodes, including ActualState node and Observation node, are introduced to Bayesian network. The Observation node is the direct child of the ActualState node. The ActualState node cannot observe itself, but can obtain an inference of its own state through the Observation node. If the Observation node obtains the true state based on evidence, the posterior probability of the ActualState node will be refreshed by computing P(ActualState|Observation = True). This model relies on the reliability of evidence from security sensors. Common inference algorithms are summarized in Table 5 .
In literature [46] , Bayesian decision network is proposed to yield scalability, and integrate the risk assessment and outcome. The premise of using this model is to generate Bayesian attack graph of the network at first. CVSS metrics are used to calculate the exploitability of each single vulnerability, and the equation is given in (32) .
where AV denotes Attack Vector, AC indicates Attack Complexity, and AU represents Authentication. Time factors may have an impact on the probability of exploits. Therefore, besides the base metrics of CVSS (AV , AC and AU ), the temporal metrics of CVSS, including Exploitability (E), Remediation Level (RL), and Report Confidence (RC) are also used in this work. The formula of Temporal Probability (TP) is given in (33) .
With the consideration of temporal metrics of CVSS, Equation (29) and (30) are changed to (34) and (35) . The definition of Bayesian decision network is given after (35) .
Bayesian Decision Network [46]: This model represents a decision network which combines a Bayesian network with additional node types for actions and utilities. Bayesian decision network contains three types of nodes. First, chance nodes, which denote random variables. Second, decision nodes, which indicate points where the decision maker has a choice of actions. Third, utility nodes, which represent the utility function of agent.
The utility node represents the expected utility (EU) associated with each action given the evidence as defined by
where E is the available evidence, A is an action with pos-
the utility of each of the outcome states, given that action A is taken, and P(O i |E, A) is the conditional probability distribution over the possible outcome states, given that evidence E is observed and action A is taken.
In addition to the applications on traditional network security, Bayesian network is also used in security risk assessment of Industrial Control Systems (ICSs). In literature [47] , a novel model called Fuzzy Probability Bayesian Network (FPBN) is proposed to evaluate dynamic risk assessment of ICSs. To solve the problem of limited historical data, fuzzy probabilities (that is, the set ofp in the definition) are used in their model instead of crisp probabilities (that is, the set of p in the definition) in standard Bayesian network. Both expert knowledge and evidence are required for risk assessment in this model. To reduce the impact from noise evidences, a noise evidence filter is embedded in the inference algorithm. The definition of FPBN is given below.
Fuzzy Probability Bayesian Network [47] : Here BN is defined as BN =< x, g x →x , p >, where
) is a set of (x) nodes in total.
• g x →x is an (x) × (x) incidence matrix that describes the relationship between the nodes, it is expressed as
x 1 x 2 · · · x (x) g 1,1 g 1,2 · · · g 1, (x) g 2,1 g 2,2 · · · g 2, (x) . . . . . . . . . . . . The definition of incidence matrix element g i,j is
• p = (p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p (x) ) is a set of conditional probability tables, p i is the conditional probability table of node x i . Fuzzy Probability Bayesian Network (FPBN) is defined as
) is a set of nodes, x i represents an ICS event with three states T (true), F (false) and U (unknown):
T event of node x i happens F event of node x i does not happen U unknown (39) There are four types of nodes in the FPBN: attack node a, function node f , incident node e, and asset node z. The event of an attack node means that an attacker launches an attack a. The event of a function node indicates that the system function f fails. The event of an incident node implies that a hazardous incident e happens. The event of an asset node marks a damage of the asset z.
• g x →x is an (x) × (x) incidence matrix. It describes the relationship between the nodes, which is the same as standard BN.
•p = (p 1 ,p 2 , . . . ,p (x) ) is a set of conditional probability tables, andp i is the fuzzy conditional probability table of node x i .
) is a set of loss, v i is the loss of node x i . If x i is an asset node, the loss v i is the value of that asset; otherwise v i = 0. There are three types of assets in ICSs: humans, environment, and properties. Development process of Known Vulnerability Risk Assessment (KVRA) based on Bayesian Network (BN) is summarized in Table 6 . Although works mentioned above make a certain contribution to network security, they only focus on known vulnerabilities. Next, the way to apply BN to unknown vulnerability risk assessment and related works will be introduced.
1) APPLYING BN TO UVRA
In unknown vulnerability risk assessment, nodes in BN represent possible states, and edges denote state transitions. Each node has a Conditional Probability Table ( CPT) that is used to quantify the effect of the parent node on child node. The prior probability and conditional probability of nodes are subjective because they come from vulnerability database with manual evaluation. To make an objective assessment, evidence from security sensors can be used to update the probability of the compromised node. Meantime, the probabilities of nodes that have relationships (parent nodes and child nodes) will also be updated.
For example, in Fig. 15 , if node p 1 is true, the probability of node p 3 being true is 0.9, and P(p 3 = T |p 1 = T ) = 0.9. If evidences from security sensors such as IDSs confirm the fact that p 3 = T , the posterior probability of P(p 1 = T |p 3 = T ) can be calculated.
In literature [45] , zero-day vulnerability is first mentioned in the domain of using Bayesian network for network security analysis, but the technology of unknown vulnerability risk assessment is not given.
In literature [48] , Bayesian network is used to estimate the likelihood of acquiring critical software vulnerabilities and exploits. This model contains 13 states (nodes) and 17 activities (edges). Besides vulnerability databases, data of the activities in this Bayesian network contains previous empirical studies and a survey with 58 individuals who discover critical software vulnerabilities. The possibility of each state being true depends on the likelihood of its related activities (or steps) being true. Meantime, the latter relies on the characteristics of software and resources of an attacker.
The advantage of this model is that it can be used to support enterprise decision making. The limitations of this model mainly include three aspects. First, this work only focuses on exploiting the root/administrator permissions of the victim host through remote access. Second, this model only considers software programs required to be compiled. Third, skills and resources of attackers will impact the decision result.
An example of the model proposed in [48] is shown in Fig. 16 . The number in this figure indicates an activity (edge), and the letter indicates a state (node). Equation (40) and (41) are required to calculate P 1 and P 2 . (2, 9, 855) ) (40) where T w denotes work days for discovering a zero-day vulnerability, LI indicates linear interpolation.
where M represents money (United States dollar) for purchasing a zero-day vulnerability, and EXP indicates exponential distribution. Equation (42) and (43) respectively denote the formula of linear interpolation and exponential distribution.
In literature [48] , when T w = {2, 9, 855}, the likelihood of discovering a zero-day vulnerability P D = {5%, 50%, 95%}, and P 3 = P 4 = 1. If T w = 50 ∈ [9, 855], M = 7000, and λ = 1.32 * 10 −5 . The calculation process of vulnerability risk assessment in Fig. 16 is given as follows:
855−9 * (50 − 9) = 52.2% • P 2 = 1.32 * 10 −5 e −1.32 * 10 −5 * 7000 = 8.8% • P A = P 1 = 52.2%,P B = P 2 = 8.8% • P R = P A P 3 ∪ P B P 4 = 52.2% * 1 + 8.8% * 1 − 52.2% * 1 * 8.8% * 1 = 56.4% If P A P 3 and P B P 4 are regarded as S 1 and S 2 respectively, which can be founded in the definition of attack graph, it can be clearly discovered that the idea of the cumulative score in attack graph is applied to calculating P R . The future work of this model is to consider other types of vulnerabilities.
To investigate the possibility of improving the tolerance for Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) with zero-day attack by defending against known weakness, in literature [34] , a model called Bayesian Risk Network (BRN) is proposed. In this model, nodes represent different meanings, including target nodes, attack nodes and requirement nodes. Edges represent correlation between nodes. Data source of nodes in BRN comes from the ICS Top 10 Threats and Countermeasures, and Common Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities in ICSs. They belong to the application layer of OSI model.
To measure the minimum effort required for zero-day exploits to compromise a system, tolerance is defined as a probabilistic metric. Then, Bayesian network is used to analyze the zero-day threat propagation across ICSs. Attackers can choose a known or zero-day weakness at each step to propagate the risk. If the exploitability of the chosen weakness and its previous exploited target are obtained, the probability of successful exploit can be computed. The definition of Bayesian Risk Network is given below.
Bayesian Risk Network [34] : Let B =< N , P T , P E , P R , P T 0 > be a Bayesian Risk Network, where • N = T ∪ ε ∪ R, including target nodes, attack nodes and requirement nodes.
. , P T n } includes conditional probabilities of all non-root target nodes given their parents such that P T x denotes P(T x |
is the probability of T x given the weakness used at E T x T x .
. , P E T n Tn } includes conditional probability distribution for all attack nodes such that P E T x Tx denotes P(E T x T x |T x ).
, and P(R x |R x ) is the assigned proportion of R x in R x .
• P T 0 is the prior probability distribution of the root node T 0 .
• P(T x ) is the unconditional probability of T x ∈ T , which can be obtained by:
P(T x ) is obtained by its parent node P(T x ) recursively until it hits the root T 0 whose probability distribution is known. E T x Tx denotes E T x T x is marginalized. P T x , P R x and P E T x Tx are given by P T , P R and P E respectively. P(T x |E T x T x = ω z ) equals to the uncertain exploitability of the zero-day exploit ω z at T x .
• P(R x ) denotes the unconditional probability of R x inR given its parents R x and P(R x ) = R x P R x R x ∈pa(R x ) P(R x ), where pa(R x ) are marginally independent. An example of Bayesian risk network with no control deployed is given in Fig. 17 [34] . White ovals denote target nodes, grey ovals indicate attack nodes, and blue ovals represent requirement nodes. The exploitability of weakness {w1, w2, w3, w4, w5} is {80%, 60%, 70%, 80%, 60%}. w means the weight of corresponding target node. There are two cases in Fig. 17 . Conditional Probability Tables (CPTs) with white color denote the case with no zeroday exploit, and the risk is 30.94%. CPTs with yellow color indicate the case that zero-day exploit z1 exists in the network, and the exploitability is set to 80%. Under this circumstance, the risk rises from 30.94% to 34.29%.
Compared with Fig. 17, in Fig. 18 , the exploitability of z1 is set to 100%. And control is deployed to combat w1, which decreases half exploitability of w1 (from 80% to 40%). Under this circumstance, the risk decreases from 34.29% to 26 .70%, which is also lower than the first case in Fig. 17 . In other words, with the implementation of reasonable control, the tolerance of the system against zero-day exploits can be improved.
Although tolerance and k-zero day safety are different, they are similar. More specifically, they are both looking for a value to indicate the condition that the systems (or other network assets) can be compromised. It is worth noting that the idea of calculating logical OR node in Bayesian attack graph is applied to calculating the compromised probability of target node T 3. The future development of this graph model is to cancel the assumption that the exploitability of each weakness will always decrease 50% under control deployed.
2) DISCUSSION ON BN FROM ADVANTAGES, FLAWS AND SOLUTIONS
The advantages of Bayesian network mainly include three aspects. First, Bayesian network provides a causalconsequence relationship between random variables, which is similar to attack graph. Second, Bayesian network is a directed acyclic graph and provides a more compact representation with all attack path information. In other words, Bayesian network shows better scalability in medium and large networks. Third, Bayesian network provides a form of reasoning partial belief under uncertain conditions. However, Bayesian network also exists flaws. For example, Bayesian network includes boundary constraints on probability of state values of the variables. To solve this problem, fuzzy probabilities can be used to replace the crisp probabilities in standard Bayesian networks. Meantime, it is important to investigate whether the BN models used for problems associated with insiders are applicable for Industrial Control System (ICS) environments, especially for a control room with an operator [34] .
Bayesian risk network is an extended model of Bayesian network, which can be used to improve the safety of Industrial Control Systems (ICSs). This model is constructed at the level of assets rather than states and attributes. The advantage of BRN is that it can model zero-day exploits with the limitation of details about them (such as pre-requisites or postconditions) [34] .
However, there are three types of nodes in this model, and the probability calculation methods are different according to the node type. That is, the complexity of analyzing a Bayesian risk network is high. Moreover, this work only considers individual zero-day weakness at different targets. Meantime, it does not consider the cost of deploying control solution [8] . To further verify the validity of this model, the case that one attack path contains multiple zero-day exploits needs to be considered. In addition, the cost (mainly includes human resource, time, and money) of each solution should also be given.
Looking forward to future development, attacks from insiders also need to be considered to verify whether this model can address both internal and external issues as well as social engineering attacks, collusion attacks, etc.
IV. DGM FOR UVRA BASED ON SYSTEM-LEVEL DATA
This section introduces directed graph models for unknown vulnerability risk assessment whose nodes are constructed by system-level data. Due to the lack of related works, only the system call is discussed in this section. Directed graph models that rely on system-level data include System Object Dependency Graph (SODG) and Object Instance Graph (OIG).
The rest of this section is arranged as follows. First, the concepts of these models are given, including the definitions and purposes. Next, the general process of applying these directed graphs to UVRA is given, and related works of these models will be analyzed. Finally, these directed graph models will be discussed from three aspects, including advantages, flaws and solutions.
A. SYSTEM OBJECT DEPENDENCY GRAPH (SODG)
In literature [49] , a model called System Object Dependency Graph (SOGD) is proposed to reveal zero-day attack paths. Nodes in SODG represent system objects, such as files, processes and sockets. Edges in SODG indicate the dependency between system calls. Labels on edges represent when the system calls occur. The definition of SODG is given below.
System Object Dependency Graph [49] : If the system call trace for the i − th host is denoted as i , then the SODG for the host is a directed graph G(V i , E i ), where: To build a complete SODG of a managed network, each host should construct its own SODG at first. System calls are parsed to generate nodes and edges in each SODG. The auditing of system calls on each host is performed at first to filter the useless information. Then, system call traces from individual hosts are sent to the analysis machine after filtering. Next, to obtain the complete SODG, different SODGs should be connected together if and only if there is at least one same directed edge that appears in different graphs simultaneously. Since it is difficult to discover zero-day vulnerabilities alone, zero-day attacks are identified by calculating the risk probability of Suspicious Intrusion Propagation Paths (SIPPs) [49] . SIPPs can be divided into path metric, and the definition of SIPPs is given below. Suspicious Intrusion Propagation Paths [49] : If the networkwide SODG is denoted as ∪G(V i , E i ), where G(V i , E i ) denotes the per-host SODG for the i − th host, then the SIPPs are s subgraph of ∪G(V i , E i ), denoted as G(V , E ), where:
• V is the set of nodes, and V ⊂ ∪V i ; • E is the set of directed edges, and E ⊂ ∪E i ; • V is initialized to include trigger nodes only. And trigger nodes come from SODG objects that are involved in the alert from security sensors (such as IDSs); [49] at first. This work exists two main flaws. First, as shown in Fig. 19 , SODG may exist cycles. Second, this work assumes that both preknowledge and common features at OS-level can be obtained, which is hard to accomplish in reality. The existence of cycles will lead to the complexity of risk assessment.
2) DISCUSSION ON SODG FROM ADVANTAGES, FLAWS AND SOLUTIONS
The advantage of this model is that it identifies zero-day attacks by paths rather than single exploit. The reason is that individual zero-day exploit is hard to detect in reality.
The flaw of this graph model is the existence of cycles, which will lead to the difficulty of quantification. Meantime, the readability of SODG will become worse with the growth of network scale.
A model called object instance graph is proposed to solve the problems of SODG. This model will be introduced next.
B. OBJECT INSTANCE GRAPH (OIG)
To solve the problem of SODG that it may exist cycles, in literature [50] , a model called object instance graph is proposed. Each node in object instance graph indicates an object instance, and each edge represents the dependency relation between nodes. The definition of object instance graph is given below.
Object Instance Graph [50] : If the system call trace in a time window T [t begin , t end ] is denoted as T and the set of system objects (mainly processes, files or sockets) involved in T is denoted as O T , then the object instance graph is a directed graph G T (V , E), where:
• V is the set of nodes, and initialized to empty set ∅; • E is the set of directed edges, and initialized to empty set ∅; • If a system call syscall ∈ T is parsed into two system object instances src i , sink j , i, j ≥ 1, and a dependency relation dep c : src i → sink j , where src i is the i th instance of system object src ∈ O T , and sink j is the j th instance of system object sink
The timestamps for syscall, dep c , src i , and sink j are respectively denoted as t_syscall, t_dep c , t_src i , and t_sink j . The t_dep c inherits t_syscall from syscall. The index i and j are determined before adding src i and sink j into V by: -For ∀src m , sink n ∈ V , m, n ≥ 1, if i max and j max are respectively the maximum indexes of instances for object src and sink, and; -If ∃src k ∈ V , k ≥ 1, then i = i max , and t_src i stays the same; Otherwise, i = 1, and t_src i is updated to t_syscall; -If ∃sink z ∈ V , z ≥ 1, then j = j max + 1; Otherwise, j = 1. In both cases t_sink j is updated to t_syscall;
• If a → b ∈ E and b → c ∈ E, then c transitively depends on a.
1) APPLYING OIG TO UVRA
Object instance graph relies on SODG. The process of applying SODG to UVRA can be founded in the previous section. Object instance graph eliminates the cycles in SODG by creating corresponding number of object instances according to the frequency that an object being called. An example of object instance graph is given in Fig. 20 . From Fig. 20 , it can be clearly discovered that the cycle exists in Fig. 19 is eliminated. The infection propagation model is shown in Fig. 21 , which contains two different cases.
First, when there are instances from different timestamps of the same object (file 1), if an instance of the previous timestamp (node B) is infected, the instance of the latter timestamp (node C) must also be infected.
Second, if an instance of the previous timestamp (node B) is not infected, the instance of the latter timestamp (node C) may be infected by other object (node A). Contact infection rate τ denotes the probability that node C gets infected when node A is infected, and intrinsic infection rate ρ indicates the probability that node C gets infected when node A is not infected.
To eliminate the assumption that all pre-knowledge and common features at OS-level can be obtained in [49] , Bayesian network is applied to object instance graph because it can model cause-and-effect relations, and incorporate intrusion evidences from various security sensors. In this work, Local Observation Model (LOM) is used to incorporate evidences, which has been introduced in Fig. 14. The future development of this graph model is to solve the problem that some attack paths cannot be revealed when attack time span exceeds the analysis time period.
2) DISCUSSION ON OIG FROM ADVANTAGES, FLAWS AND SOLUTIONS
The advantage of this model is that Bayesian network can be applied to this model for calculating the probability of nodes being infected.
Scalability is one of the defects of this model, because multiple object instances will be generated if system objects are called frequently. To solve the problem of scalability, besides the pruning operations already mentioned in [50] , another way is to merge different instance nodes of the same object. These instance nodes do not include evidences from security sensors, and nodes whose compromised probabilities are lower than the threshold should also be excluded. Meantime, these nodes that can be merged only have one child node. After merging, the representation is < t start , t end >: (pid : ppid : pcmd), where t start denotes the start time of merging, t end indicates the end time of merging, pid means process ID, ppid represents the ID of parent process, and pcmd is process command. An example of this idea is given in Fig. 22 . Nodes in the dotted line on the left-hand side of Fig. 22 are required to be merged. The node in the dotted box on the right-hand side of Fig. 22 is the merging result. As can be seen from Fig. 22 , this idea simplifies the graph on the basis of retaining the information in the original version.
In addition, when some attack activities evade system calls, or the attack time span exceeds the analysis time period, the constructed instance graphs may not capture the complete zero-day attack paths. Genetic algorithm can be used to solve this problem because it is highly suited to NP-complete problems, such as searching through all attack paths [51] .
V. CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS
The technology of Unknown Vulnerability Risk Assessment (UVRA) based on directed graph models is still in the development stage, and many problems are urgently required to be solved. Meantime, the common challenges of mentioned directed graph models for UVRA can be summarized into following aspects:
• Obtaining zero-day vulnerabilities. Zero-day vulnerabilities are difficult to obtain, current researches often set a time point to divide known vulnerabilities into known and unknown vulnerabilities [8] , [21] . • The improvement of directed graph models and risk assessment methods. The applications of existing models have certain limitations. Further improvement on the theoretical system of unknown vulnerability risk assessment based on directed graphs is required. Combining existing researches and prospect for future development, possible solutions for the above challenges are given as follows:
• Due to the difficulty of obtaining zero-day vulnerabilities, the method that dividing them from known vulnerabilities by setting a time point will be continuously used in the future. Another possible approach is when dividing zero-day vulnerabilities from known vulnerabilities, the time for fixing a vulnerability should also be considered as a classification indicator;
• The growth of network nodes inevitably increases the time complexity for generating attack graphs. One solution is to use the idea of distributed attack graph generation [52] to overcome the state space explosion problems with the growth of hosts and vulnerabilities in a managed network;
• Not only the inherent characteristic of the vulnerability (exploitability), but also time and environmental factors of security metrics should be considered to obtain a more accurate risk assessment. When multiple security metrics are used to quantify network security risks, fuzzy comprehensive risk assessment can be used to determine the severity of the risk. The successful application of bio-diversity in risk assessment reflects the possibility of integration between different scientific research fields. Some methods regard alerts from security sensors as evidences to dynamically update the exploitability of corresponding nodes, so the accuracy of risk assessment can be indirectly enhanced by improving the reliability of security sensors;
• To obtain a better model, fusion between directed graph models is an existing method (such as Bayesian attack graph which is the fusion product of attack graph and Bayesian network) and ongoing approach.
VI. DISCUSSION
Unknown Vulnerability Risk Assessment (UVRA) focuses on zero-day vulnerabilities. A typical zero-day attack may last for 310 days on average [53] . To protect against zeroday attacks, various methods are proposed. These methods are classified as statistics, signatures and behavior techniques [54] . In order to meet the future trend, the classification needs to be further expanded. The following content introduces the future work directions of UVRA from the perspective of techniques and application trends.
A. MAIN TECHNIQUES FOR URVA
The main techniques for UVRA are listed as follows, including current popular techniques and methods that will play an important role in the future. Their defects at the current stage will be analyzed, which can be regarded as the future work directions of UVRA.
1) STATISTICAL-BASED TECHNIQUES
Zero-day detection based on statistical techniques relies on static attack profile and manual modifications of detection settings. For example, Nessus is a vulnerability scanner, which is often used in vulnerability risk assessment. The principle of Nessus is to compare the defects of hosts with the vulnerability features stored in the vulnerability database. The list of hosts that need to be scanned is manually configured by users. If the defects match the vulnerability features, they will be regarded as vulnerabilities. Therefore, this method is not suitable for real-time detection and defense.
2) SIGNATURE-BASED TECHNIQUES As mentioned before, suspicious activities whose signatures are not defined previously in Snort IDS/IPS are regarded as zero-day exploits. A signature is a sequence of bytes at specific locations within the executable, a regular expression, a hash value of binary data, or any other formats created by malware analyst which should accurately identify malware instances [55] . This kind of method relies on previous malware signatures, which means unknown malware without known signatures will not be detected.
3) BEHAVIOR-BASED TECHNIQUES
Methods based on behaviors assume that malware can be detected by observing the malicious behaviors exhibited by malware during runtime [55] . Compared with signaturebased techniques, behavior-based methods focus on observing malware actions instead of previously known signatures. Therefore, behavior-based methods have a better performance on malware variants with similar behaviors but different structures. However, their flaws are the high false positive rate and worse performance on mimicry attacks.
4) GRAPH THEORY
This method is the core content of our paper. It can be clearly discovered that the advantage of this method is to visualize the network status by graphs. Each path represents the strategy that attackers may use to achieve the goal. However, the probability that each attack path being adopted by attackers cannot be known by only using the knowledge of graph theory. Among the current researches of UVRA based on directed graph models, most of them use both directed graphs and security metrics to complete qualitative and quantitative tasks. 
5) SECURITY METRICS
In UVRA, security metrics are used to quantitatively evaluate the probability that network systems will be exploited when facing attacks. Security metrics are often used in conjunction with graph models, which is the main theme of our paper. The previous classification work of security metrics can be seen in Table 4 . However, there is a gap in the previous work to classify the security metrics for UVRA. Therefore, the supplementary work is made in our paper, which can be seen in Table 7 .
6) PROBABILITY THEORY
The original purpose of proposing probability theory is to analyze the frequency of events. These events can be repeated, such as throwing a coin and observing whether the coin falls to the front or the back. However, some events cannot be repeated. For example, supposing the probability of a host being exploited is p, and assuming the threshold to be reached for an emergency fix is q. If p > q, the host requires to be repaired immediately. Otherwise, it does not need to do that. The former is called the frequentist probability, which is directly related to the frequency of events. The latter is called the Bayesian probability, which involves the level of certainty. Bayesian theory enables us to infer the uncertainty of network attacks. The combination of Bayesian theory and graph theory is Bayesian network.
7) ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
Artificial intelligence (AI) can be simply regarded as using computer science to simulate human thinking. It has been called one of the three cutting-edge technologies (genetic engineering, nanoscience, and artificial intelligence) of the world in the 20th century. And it is also considered to be one of the cutting-edge technologies (space, energy, and artificial intelligence) of the world in the 21th century. AI will play a vital role in vulnerability risk assessment. Methods for vulnerability risk assessment can be divided into three steps [56] .
The first step is manual vulnerability assessment. This method is time costing and depends on expert knowledge deeply.
The second step is assistive vulnerability assessment, which is the stage of most current researches. This method requires the help of vulnerability scanners or frameworks to find the most relevant security weakness. Therefore, the lack of flexibility and compatibility will be the inherent defects of this method. And the dependency on expert knowledge still exists.
The third step is fully automated vulnerability assessment, which is based on the technology of artificial intelligence. Compared with the first and second step, this method can produce expert-level decisions without the help of human beings, which will reduce the costs on time and economic. However, this technology is still in the development stage, and further researches on automated vulnerability mitigation techniques that can actually protect computing platforms are still required [56] .
B. APPLICATION TRENDS OF UVRA
Unknown Vulnerability Risk Assessment (UVRA) focuses on traditional network at first. However, devices connected to the network are no longer just hosts, they show a trend of diversification. The result is that existing UVRA techniques may lose their power on these devices, such as intelligent robots, vehicles, etc. Therefore, it is important to correctly grasp the application trends of UVRA. Due to the variety of application scenarios, the following content only focuses on the future work directions of UVRA on Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT), robots and vehicles.
1) IIoT
Nowadays, the era of Internet of Things (IoT) is coming. The number and types of devices connected to IoT are far beyond traditional networks. In other words, there are more vulnerabilities in IoT than traditional networks. Moreover, with a constant growth of attack surfaces and capabilities, network systems will suffer from more serious attacks. Therefore, UVRA is a key technology to keep IoT security. Industrial IoT (IIoT) is an application of IoT on industry, with the aim of improving the overall operational efficiency in industrial management [57] . Events that exploiting the vulnerabilities in the devices of IIoT happen frequently recent years. The future work directions on applying UVRA to IIoT are as follows:
• New security metrics to quantify vulnerabilities in IIoT.
The cost and return on patching a vulnerability should be considered;
• New assessment frameworks and specific vulnerability database for IIoT. Due to the difficulty to update the underlying light weight operating system, many vulnerabilities in IoT devices cannot be expected to be patched and upgraded. Therefore, new assessment frameworks should be able to provide risk mitigation strategies to improve security;
• New risk vectors that satisfy the form of International IoT Asset Classification (IIoTAC) and Key IoT Cyber Risk Factors (KIoTCRF) [58] ;
• New methods to solve the low attack path quantification degree and complex path finding.
2) ROBOTS
With the rise of AI technology, different types of intelligent robots are constantly being connected to the network. However, robots are typically not created with security as a main concern [59]. Therefore, the existence of vulnerabilities in robots is an inevitable fact. At present, researches on the vulnerability risk assessment of robots are lacking. In order to achieve an effective vulnerability risk assessment, the following points can be the future work directions:
• New security metrics to quantify vulnerabilities in robots. A novel security metric called Robot Vulnerability Scoring System (RVSS) [59] is proposed to evaluate the severity caused by corresponding vulnerabilities. This metric is an improvement of CVSS. However, there is almost no relevant metric for zero-day vulnerabilities in robots;
• New assessment framework and specific vulnerability database for robots. Due to the difference between robot and conventional vulnerabilities on features, some reported robot vulnerabilities are difficult to be classified by existing standards. Moreover, the severity assessment of robot vulnerabilities is also quite different from conventional vulnerabilities.
3) VEHICLES
Besides robots, vehicles also connect to the network and become network/physical systems, which are the core component of Intelligent Transportation System (ITS). Vulnerabilities in vehicles can cause the loss of property, even the personal safety of users. However, the research on assessing the impact of network/physical attacks on road users and system operators is lacking [60] . Although literature [60] takes a step forward in the vulnerability risk assessment of vehicles, it only finishes the qualitative work of vulnerabilities. The future work directions on vulnerability risk assessment of vehicles are listed as follow:
• Trying to apply Bayesian network to in-vehicle network. The reason is that there is a high degree of uncertainty about the impact of security breaches on the in-vehicle network [60] . Bayesian network can infer uncertainty and visualize attack paths;
• Proposing novel security metrics to quantify vulnerabilities in vehicles. A common idea is to improve existing standards to adapt new application scenarios.
VII. CONCLUSION
Directed graph models for unknown vulnerability risk assessment are formed by enumerating possible attack paths (or called attack strategies) from the perspective of attackers. They play an important role on risk assessment and decision making for administrators. In this paper, the concepts and definitions of directed graph models are given at first. Then, these models are analyzed from three aspects, including advantages, flaws and solutions. Next, corresponding examples are given to facilitate understanding. After that, challenges and solutions of unknown vulnerability risk assessment based on directed graph models are given. Meantime, Security metrics for unknown vulnerability risk assessment based on directed graph models are summarized and classified. At last, future work directions of UVRA are discussed from the perspective of techniques and applications. At present, the survey of unknown vulnerability risk assessment based on directed graph models is relatively lacking, so our work is valuable. 
